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. . . because ontos is always a question of ethos and praxis. 
In  that  sense,  the  tone  of  a  thing  tells  us  more  than 
anything  else  what  it  is, for  its  tone  is  its  ethic,  its 
practice, its ontology, its rapport. 
— fragilekeys
1 
 
  Be aware of deception. Rolle’s The Form of Living wrestles with 
deception; not to beware, but to be  aware. How does one  form 
living  in  the  face  of  such  common  deception?  And,  as  Rolle  is 
concerned with deception, as such, living then must be something 
taken from deception; it is something that must be formed, shaped 
out of what is before us. Of course, there are those who cannot rise 
to love God: “þay fallen in lustes and lykynge of þis world, and for 
þey þynken ham swete” (7-8).
2 They “þynken” them sweet; their 
taste for faux sweetness has left them fallen. They have no form—
those  who  are  deceived.  Rolle  addresses  The  Form  to  one  who 
wants to fashion a solitary life, but this solitary life is shaped from 
this miasma of deception. The problem of reality is paramount. On 
the one hand, there are many things that lead the solitary astray: 
the devil, sin, the flesh. On the other hand there is revelatory depth 
beneath  these  obstacles—a  way  to  live  that  is  bound  to  these 
obstacles that reveals truth. Rolle is not rejecting the act of rejecting 
sin;  as  he  repeats,  it  is  sin  that  will  lead  the  soul  to  everlasting 
torment  that  is  without  comparison.  However,  that  reality—the 
                                                                                                                    
Thank you to Andrew Albin (Fordham University) for his assitance with 
relevant passages to Melos Amoris. 
1 http://fragilekeys.com/2012/04/26/common-ontology/. 
2 All citations from The Form of Living come from Richard Rolle: Prose and 
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reality of sin—is at the same time a real deception—it leads one to 
live a false life so that the solitary does not know who they are, 
does not allow themselves to be led by God or joined with Him. 
However, it is the awareness of deception that is necessary since it 
produces the furniture of the hermit’s room.
3 
What am I to you? Initially, the solitary does not know itself.  
Rolle devises a chart of being with two axes. On one axis, Rolle 
explores  the  being  of  the  contemplative  in  love:  how  do  I 
recognize  myself  in  you?  On  the  other  axis,  Rolle  sets  out  the 
being of Love itself. The question of how to love God is found on 
this second axis. Rolle needs to address the act that will lead to 
burning,  the  fire  of  love.  Rolle  emphasizes  a  kind  of  stability: 
“verray loue is to loue hym with al þi myght stalworthy, in al þi 
hert wisely, in al þi soule deuotely and sweetly” (705-707). Might 
stalworthy,  hert  wisely,  soule  deuowtly  and  sweetly—these  three 
flow to constitute the gift of the contemplative to God. I will give my 
will, my heart, my soul—these are the elements of my solitary body. The 
solitary  body  is  not  anatomical,  but  a  being  like  an  exploded 
diagram. The will, the heart, the soul are the organs that matter; 
they float around each other in concentric orbits around the God-
touch. This is the becoming that the mystic opens itself to. These 
three organs reach out to sense—this is the open space by which the 
contemplative touches a withdrawing God-object. 
The form of living, this progressive verb—living—indicates that 
this form is found in the shifting, and it will not be fixed. “‘Ontology’ 
means  doctrine  of  being.”
4  So  begins  Martin  Heidegger’s  1923 
lecture course where he lays out the philosophical investigation of 
ontology that finds full fruition in Being and Time. This early lecture 
course,  however,  provides  us  with  Heidegger’s  definition  of 
phenomenology  as  a  mode  of  research,  one  that  “needs  to  be 
understood in accord with its possibility as something which is not 
publicly and self-evidently given . . . Objects come to be defined 
just as they give themselves.”
5 From this we can understand Rolle’s 
need to develop an awareness of deception—it is not self-evident. 
                                                                                                                    
3 Although The Form of Living was written for a very specific anchoress, in 
this  commentary  I  am  going  to  use  anchorite/anchoress/hermit/solitary 
interchangeably.  This  may  undermine  historicism,  but  I  am  aiming  for 
how this text speaks trans-historically. 
4 Martin Heidegger, Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. John van 
Buren (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008), 1. 
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As well, we notice that as sin presents itself it remains fixed. It is 
always already the devil, the sin, the fleshy world. In recognizing 
that there is evil, the index of the transcendent is evident . It is in 
shifting, in living, that the solitary recognizes their capability, their 
thing-hood. The solitary is a shape that must be made. As Graham 
Ward writes, “an orientation toward ontology—some model of the 
relationship between existence and existents, being and becoming—
is necessary. The question also presupposes that an enquiry into 
the relationship is possible. The question demands that there is or 
can  be  an  identification  of  a  ‘thing,’  an  understanding  of 
thinghood.”
6  For  Ward,  the  debate  surrounding  the  ontological 
nature of God is between God as beyond (such as found in Jean-
Luc Marion or Heidegger) and God in the Augustinian sense, as 
source. For Ward, then, the debate is between a philosophical and 
theological  line  of  questioning  one  in  which  the  former  is 
contained  in the  latter  (for Augustine, and, thus, Ward). Ward’s 
concern with “thinghood,” however is important for Rolle’s sense 
of  the  God-object and the  solitary that I mentioned earlier. For 
Ward “its ‘thinghood’ and the varieties of ‘thinghood’ of which it is 
composed  is  never  stable,  never  static.  Its  thinghood  is  in 
suspension,  as  the  ‘what’  is  what  it  is  in  the  fullness  of  its 
becoming.”
7 Ward echoes an object-oriented ontology here in that 
what  Ward  calls  “suspension,”  OOO  philosophers  would  call 
withdrawal. Ward further elucidates, “whether a thing is can never 
be fully defined. That there is can be affirmed, but the nature of 
that is is not a thing that can be grasped or even experienced as an 
is, as presence, as that which can be isolated as present to itself.”
8 
Ward writes that only in the line of questioning do we have a sense 
of God’s presence, but we will never know God-in-himself; “the 
                                                                                                                    
6  Graham  Ward,  “Questioning  God”  in  Questioning  God,  ed.  John  D. 
Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael J. Scanlon (Blooming: Indiana UP, 
2001), 279.  Also see Joannes Scottus Eriugena, who, in the  Periphyseon 
writes, “Divine essence, which in Its pure state surpasses all intellect, is 
rightly said to be created in the things made by, through, in, and directed 
toward Itself; so It is recognized in Its creations through the intellect (if the 
creations  are  solely  intelligible)  or  the  senses  (of  they  are  sensibles)  of 
those who search for it with proper zeal” (Periphyseon: On the Division of 
Nature,  ed.  and  trans.  Myra  L.  Uhlfelder  [Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill, 
1976], 17). 
7 Ward, 280. 
8 Ward, 280. GLOSSATOR 7 
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questioning of God (both subjective and objective genitive) never 
ends; it just plumbs deeper into the mystery of the Godhead as the 
Godhead unfolds its own infinite nature.”
9 
If the fundamental question of ontology is ‘what is?’ then The 
Form  of  Living  investigates  that  question  through  the  lens  of  the 
becoming continuity of the hermit-God relationship, and in that 
becoming the God-object floats. Therefore, Rolle is concerned with 
separating  how  what  is  relates  to  that  which  negates.  And,  what 
negates is what stands still. For Rolle, the problem of ontology is 
finding the ways in which the solitary can fulfill their capability. 
Grace  Jantzen’s  commentary  on  a  queer  theology  assists  us  in 
thinking  through  Rolle’s  attempt  to  “uncouple”  the  hermit  from 
traditional  frames  of  reference,  to  be  aware  of  what  is  not  self-
evident.  Jantzen  is  interested  in  a  theology  that  “gets  rid  of  the 
straight and narrow boundaries of traditional Christendom and is 
open  to  difference,  fluidity,  curvature.”
10  This  fluidity  and 
curvature finds fulfillment in the aesthetics of the self:  
 
those  of  us  who  already  take  up  queer  positions  have 
some extra practice in the creativity and the cost of an 
aesthetics of the self. We are learning how to dig deep 
into our best possibilities, and not to allow ourselves to 
become  flat  mirrors  of  our  contexts,  reflecting  and 
reinforcing its self-perceptions . . . the mirror we hold up 
to our culture, religious and secular, is a mirror of curves 
and  corners  that  reveals  the  multiple  distortions  of 
discursive and material reality.
11 
 
Rolle repeats in many of his works the formula “knowest thi self” 
(453-454). The need to know oneself is integral in understanding 
the life of solitude, as well as how that life opens towards God.
12 
                                                                                                                    
9 Ward, 282. 
10  Grace  Jantzen,  “Contours  of  a  Queer  Theology”  in  Feminism  and 
Theology, ed. Janet Martin Soskice and Diana Lipton (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2003), 344. 
11 Jantzen, 351. 
12  Rolle’s  need  for  ontological  prescription  finds  its  counterpart  in 
Heidegger’s  commentary  on  the  relationship  between  object  and 
hermeneutic: “the theme of this hermeneutical investigation is the Dasein 
which is in each case our own and indeed as hermeneutically interrogated 
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Rolle’s hermitic ontology is based on fulfilling being; in a word, 
how the hermit is becoming-hermit. 
  At  the  heart  of  Rolle’s  ontology  is  the  role  of  God  in  the 
hermitic life. But role is too static of a word: God is a catalyst in the 
relationships. It is the middle of the river. God is revealed through 
the connections between solitary and God. God is not present to 
itself because it is never fixed. The solitary’s relationship with the 
unknown is where they find God. So, God is not a stable object, 
rather, something only definable in terms of movement, in terms of 
love. God is an unhittable moving target. God is negated when the 
relationship  between  God  and  solitary  is  disrupted  by  sin, 
deception, or falsity. Early in The Form of Living, Rolle warns that 
people are not what they seem. It is easy to see “worldisshe men 
and  wommen  that  vsen  glotony  or  lecherie  and  other  oppyn 
synnes, bot þei ben also in sum men þat semen in penaunce and in 
good  lif”  (18-20).  Rolle  emphasizes  the  “semen”  throughout  this 
text. Worldly people wallow in gluttony and lechery, so it is easy to 
see what not to do in their case; they are actively and publicly 
sinning, but they are also standing still—they are gluttony, they are 
lechery, and it fixes them like so many pins inside so many bugs.  
The  lecherous,  the  greedy,  they  are,  perhaps,  easy  to  spot. 
Rolle  poses  the  question  about  those  we  might  identify  as  role 
models:  the  priests,  the  bishops,  the  enclosed,  who,  to  all 
appearances, are living a holy life. What if they are also—on the 
inside—actually  sinning  and  leading  an  unholy  life?  Rolle 
emphasizes that what happens in these situations is that the devil 
especially likes to pick apart the holy: “when he seth a man or a 
womman  amonge  a  þousand  turne  ham  holy  to  God  .  .  .  a 
thousand wiles he hath in what manere he may deceeyue ham” 
(21-25). Further, Rolle writes, if he cannot make them publicly sin 
so that others can see them for what they are, “he begileth many so 
priuely þat þai can nat oft tymes fele þe trape þat hath take ham 
(26-28). The devil then sets a trap that the holy person is not aware 
of—in other words they are living what they think is a holy life, but 
in truth they are ensnared in a devil’s web because they are living 
in imagination, as opposed to what is. They are fixed. In order to 
live more harmoniously with God this trap must be avoided. 
                                                                                                                    
view  to  developing  in  it  a  radical  wakefulness  for  itself,”  (Ontology—the 
Hermeneutics of Facticity, 12). The wakefulness is what Rolle is addressing 
against the problem of deception. GLOSSATOR 7 
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  But, first Rolle insists we understand the very nature of the 
snares, so that the hermit can continue being. Again, Rolle wants 
us to know ourselves in order to live in God. Many of these initial 
traps have to do with pride: “sum men he taketh with errour þat he 
putteth  ham  in;  sum  with  synguler  witte,  when  he  maketh  ham 
wend þat þe thynge þat þei thynken or done is beste, and fortþi 
thei wol no conseil have of other þat ben better and connynge þan 
þei” (29-32). The  nature  of pride  is that  it cuts oneself off  from 
relationships; we fix ourselves. The self is entirely centered on the 
itself and is not opened. Further, this stain of pride attacks what 
could be beneficial spiritual activities. For example, Rolle writes 
that one could “delite in ham self of þe penaunce þat þei suffren” 
(35-36). Penance, abstinence, good works: for Rolle these are easily 
bent to be sinful as the solitary fixes them onto oneself. The activity 
stops;  it  becomes  not  a  process,  but  is  embraced  only  for  false 
outputs. Because the solitary places themselves in the middle of the 
act, cutting off the benefits that connect one with God. 
Therefore, Jesus cannot be loved “bot in clennesse” (159-160). 
This  cleanness  has  to  do  with  righting  the  self  outwards  in 
understanding true Being. The original tempter came “in an angel 
of lighte” (who “hideth yuel vndre þe liknesse of good”) (182-184). 
The  solitary’s  work  is  in  being  able  to  separate  the  “liknesse  of 
good” from Real good. So, the Real works beneath the level of 
appearance. And this “liknesse” can easily be faked while the Real 
beneath is hidden from uncritical eyes. Rolle places the solitary in 
a unique position: “the state þat þou art in, þat is solitude, þat is 
most able of al othre to reuelaciouns of þe Holy Goste” (138-139). 
The solitary, though, has a certain predilection for privation, the 
ability to push the body is a hallmark of hermitic living. However, 
Rolle emphasizes that the solitary should not be excessive in their 
habits  since  this  leads  to  further  deception.  If  the  solitary  eats, 
drinks  and  sleeps  too  well  then  it  “makes  vs  slowe  and  cold  in 
Goddis  loue”  (190).  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  is  too  much 
penance the solitary risks “destrue” of the self (192). In both cases, 
extremes lead to misconception. In the first case, easy living leads 
to too much comfort and thus a contentment in earthly pleasures 
and a distancing from God. In the second case, bodily punishment 
leads to an erasure of the body, a body that is necessary to live a 
contemplative life. There also develops a sense of competition with 
excessive ascetic practices—the solitary begins to pride themselves ROMAN – UNCOUPLING THE HERMIT 
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on their extremes and, thus, prove that these practices are not for 
God, but, rather are done out of their own excessive sense of self.  
What is the relationship between self and solitary, then? We 
can begin in thinking about the connection between body and soul. 
Rolle writes, “I know þat þi lif semeth yeuen to þe service of God. 
þan is hit sham to þe, bot if þou be as good, or bettre, within in þi 
soule, as þou art semynge at þe syght of men. Therfor turne þi þoȝt 
perfitly  to  God,  as  hit  semeth  þat  þou  hast  þi  body”  (233-234). 
Even  if  the  solitary  is  publicly  identified—bodily—as  someone 
whose spiritual practices are strong—semeth—it does not guarantee 
that they are actually living a good life devoted to God; there is a 
delineation  being  made  here:  one  between  the  body  and  the 
activities devoted to it and the activities of the soul which must be 
connected to those bodily activities. The becoming-solitary cannot 
separate oneself into two modes of being; they must flow together. 
Therefore, the solitary must move both body and soul toward God, 
aligning the soul with the body. The body is already acting like a 
hermit, but the solitary’s soul might not be. Note Rolle’s mapping 
here, since usually it is the body that leads the soul astray. Here, it 
is the soul that must correct itself to the habitation of the body.  
For Rolle, the concept of “perfit love” indicates this alignment 
of body and soul in space. In order to achieve this, the solitary 
must also contemplate time. The solitary must keep four things in 
mind: 
  
on  is  þe  mesure  of  þi  life  here,  þat  is  so  short  is  þat 
vnnethe is oght; for we lyve bot in a point . . . Anoþer is 
vncerteyntee of oure endynge; for we wot neuer whan 
we shall dey . . . The þrid is þat we shal answare before 
þe righteous juge of al þe  tyme þat we han had here: 
how we haue lyved, whate oure occupacioun hath bene 
and whi . . . The fourth is þat we þynke how mych ioy is 
þat þay shal haue, þe which lesteth in Go[ddis] love to 
har endynge. (280-288; 297-298) 
 
Not only does the solitary need to think of their life as a point—to 
reveal themselves within the control of eternity, but the solitary is 
encouraged to see that life moved forward into eternity. As Eileen 
Joy writes, “every point of each of us coincides with every point of 
everyone else in a single point which is where we all are. There is 
nowhere else. The idea of distance, or separation, or estrangement, GLOSSATOR 7 
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is a dream. Which is not to say we should not mind the gaps.”
13 
Rolle  asks the solitary to consider  this distilled point  of time  in 
which they exist and connect to everything else. In this way, Rolle 
sets up the contemplative life as a revelation: it will need to be 
revealed,  accounted  for  at  the  time  of  judgment,  but  the 
contemplative, as a way to make sense of the point of time they 
currently occupy will also set themselves into an eternal future. As 
Heidegger remarks: 
 
Taking  historical  consciousness  to  be  an  exponent  of 
being-interpreted in the today draws its motivation from 
the following criterion. The manner in which a time (the 
today which is in each case for a while at the particular 
time)  sees  and  addresses  the  past  (either  its  own  past 
Dasein or some other past Dasein), holding on to it and 
preserving it or abandoning it, is a sign of how a present 
stands  regarding  itself,  how  it  as  being-there  is  in  its 
there.
14 
 
The hermit regards itself. The “uncerteynte” of the ending of life is 
countered  by  the  comfort  of  being  “breþere  and  felewes  with 
angels and holy men, louynge and hauynge, praising and seynge 
þe kynge of joy in þe fairheed and shynynge of his mageste” (299-
301). The nature of time is both finite—life, narration of that life—
and eternal—love of God, joys of heaven. But, the contemplative 
cannot have one without the other. It is in the taking account of 
time—seeing it for what it is; seeing it for how it projects forward—
that the contemplative is the most successful in their living. 
  Rolle  emphasizes  a  certain  kind  of  life  as  the  source  of 
contemplative power, hence his emphasis on living  appropriately. 
The ideal of living appropriately is made clear in his discussion of 
being  “right  disposed”  (323).  Being  “right  disposed”  means  to 
understand the character of the human being: “what thynge fileth a 
man  .  .  .  What  maketh  hym  clene  .  .  .  what  holdeth  hym  in 
clennesse . . . what þynge draweth hym for ordeyne his wille al to 
Goddis  wille”  (323-327).  Again,  we  return  to  the  concept  of 
                                                                                                                    
13 Eileen Joy, “You Are Here: A Manifesto” in Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: 
Ethics and Objects. ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (Washington, DC: Oliphaunt 
Books, 2012), 154. 
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knowing oneself, but also, as is indicated in the use of the third-
person  “hym,”  Rolle  seems  to  be  widening  his  reach  and 
suggesting an anthropology that guides the contemplative: what is 
this “hym?” 
  It is in this “hym” that Rolle addresses the nature of hermitic 
being in the relation between the heart, the mouth, and the deed. 
These sites of the body are vulnerable to sin and must be carefully 
guarded and made right, but they also indicate the foundation of 
hermitic being. These three complement the orbiting will, heart, 
soul in which Rolle’s ontology is based: the heart, mouth, and deed 
are  points  in  the  hermitic  being  that  cause  perturbations  in  the 
local—they uncouple the hermit from one environment (the world) 
into another (the hermitic space) or, if not properly aligned with 
God, they re-couple the hermit to the world. In other words, the 
heart, mouth, and deeds  are hermitic being  in that it  is through 
them that being is constituted.  
The  heart  is  where  the  emotions  and  thought  are  situated. 
Rolle writes that the sins of the heart consist of “il thoghtis, il delite, 
assent to syn, desire of il, wikked wille . . .” (329-33). The heart is 
not  only  connected  to  emotional  stuntedness,  for  example  “il 
dreed, il loue, errour, fleishly affecioun to þi frendes or to others 
þat þou lovest” but also poor thinking, “vnstablenesse of thought, 
pyne of penaunce, ypocrisi, loue to plese men, dred to displese 
ham,  sham  of  good  deed”  (3301-332,  340-342).  Thoughts  and 
emotions are situated in the heart and this catalogue of problems 
that Rolle reports indicates both the inability to align the heart with 
God, as in the “assent to sin,” and also an unhealthy relationship 
with  the  community  and  the  self.  Being  too  concerned  with 
pleasing or displeasing others leads one astray from the ability to 
love God, but, also, leads one to be ashamed of one’s good deeds. 
Earlier in this litany of sins, Rolle writes of “perplexite (þat is dout 
what is to do, what nat, for euery man oweth to be sikyre what he 
shal do and what he shal leue)” (336-338). The idea of “perplexite,” 
this inability to decide, speaks to the bent nature of the self—it is 
being upset by a lack of becoming, of distraction that clouds the 
contemplative being.   
  If  the  sins  of  the  heart  indicate  the  ways  in  which  the 
emotions and thoughts can ground the hermit in the wrong path, 
the sins of mouth indicate the public nature of the contemplative 
being. The environment of the hermit is important in that Rolle’s 
text is attempting to move, to cause vibrations in the solitary. Rolle GLOSSATOR 7 
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recognizes that the solitary can never be completely severed from 
the world—as was indicated earlier, the body is in a relationship 
with the soul—however, he works to change the track of the solitary 
so that they are moving towards God. With his discussion of the 
mouth,  Rolle  connects  the  disjointedness  that  results  from  the 
relationship between God and community. Not only is it sinful to 
slander God or swear in his name, but to “gruch ayayns God for 
any anguys or noy or tribulacioun þat may befalle in erth” (352-
353), indicates a lack in understanding of God’s being on the part 
of  the  community.  To  “gruch”  would  imply  that  God  does  not 
know  what  it  is  doing,  and,  thus  putting  oneself  at  odds  with  a 
divine will. God is no longer part of becoming if it is out there 
acting apart from the community.  
  As  mentioned  earlier,  The  Form  of  Living  is  concerned  with 
deception—the  world  that  presents  itself  is  a  series  of  flows  and 
stops  that  produces  the  hermit.  The  concern  in  Rolle’s  hermitic 
ontology is what kinds  of  objects need to exist in order for  the 
contemplative to exist. One key to hermitic relations is the attitude 
toward neighbors. The contemplative must avoid discord with the 
neighbors: “manacynge, sowynge of discord, tresone, fals witnes, il 
consail . . . turne good deeds to il for to make ham be holden il þat 
don ham (we owen for to lap oure neghbors dedes in þe best and 
not  in  þe  worst)”  (355-358).  Rolle’s  capacious  attitude  towards 
neighbors,  to  hold  them  to  the  best  intentions  is  a  way  to 
“uncouple” from judgement. As Slavoj Žižek remarks, “the person 
who  mistrusts  his  others  is,  paradoxically,  in  his  very  cynical 
disbelief, the victim of the most radical self-deception . . . the true 
believer . . . sees Goodness in the other where the other himself is 
not aware of it.”
15 To place oneself in judgement of the neighbor’s 
deeds  or  even  to  cause  negative  political  (treason,  false  witness) 
problems  with  one’s  mouth  proves  that  one  is  out  of  joint  with 
being. 
  Finally,  Rolle  describes  the  problems  of  the  sins  of  deeds. 
Rolle begins with a roll call of the various ways one can break the 
law of the Ten Commandments. These are direct acts against the 
Law,  but,  again,  Rolle  widens  actions  to  describe  community 
disharmony. Rolle is critical of hurting “any man in his body or in 
his goodes or in his fame . . . , withhold necessaries fro þe body or 
yeve hit outrage . . . , feynynge of moore good þan we haue for to 
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seme holier or connynger or wiser þan we bene” (367-372). Again, 
Rolle  speaks  to  the  way  that  these  elements—God,  self, 
community—constitute  the  being  of  the  contemplative.  It  is  of 
interest to note not only the power that the contemplative has in 
his  community,  and  the  damage  the  solitary  can  cause  through 
making themselves out to be better than they are, but the political 
nature that it can also hold. Rolle warns against treason and false 
witness, and also harming goods. There is a sense that Rolle has 
cast a wide net—these are the problems of every body and, thus, his 
anthropology is of human failing, what is wrong or out of joint with 
Being. On the other hand, however, Rolle is suggesting that human 
being is not a lost cause—the nature of the human simply needs to 
be remedied in a clear fashion: 
 
the  thynges  þat  clenseth  vs  of  þat  filthede  ben  þre, 
ayeyns þay þre manere of synnes. Þe first is sorowe of 
hert ayeynes þe synnes of thought; and þat behoueth to 
be perfite, þat þou wolt neuer syn moor . . . The tother is 
shrift of mouth again þe syn of mouth; and þat shal be 
hasted  withouten  delayynge,  naked  withouten 
excusynge, and entier without departynge, as for to tel a 
syn to oon prest and anoþer to anothre; sey al þat þou 
wost to oon, or al is nat worth. The þrid is satisfaccioun, 
þat hath þre parties, fastynge, prier, and almsysdede . . . 
for  to  foryeve  ham  þat  doth  þe  wronge  and  pray  for 
ham,  and  enfourme  ham  how  þay  shal  do  þat  ben  in 
poynt to perisshe. (399-410) 
 
The advice that Rolle provides here is in protracting the body into 
stability. Stability, though, is a kind of flow. The mouth should be 
given “shrift” but also made transparent. Rather than try to spread 
around one’s sins to multiple priests so that no one has any clear 
idea of the depth of sin, one should tell them all to one so as to 
avoid shallowness. The depth of the solitary needs to be revealed. 
  This becoming toward God by the contemplative is based on 
Rolle’s discussion of the nature of love. Rolle’s discussion of love 
involves  two  dimensions.  First,  Rolle  addresses  degrees  of  love. 
These degrees of love are levels to which the contemplative must 
attain  or  “win”  (525).  The  other  dimension  of  love  that  Rolle 
discusses is Love itself—the being of Love. If The Form of Living is a 
guide for contemplative to turn their life to God, Rolle’s ontology GLOSSATOR 7 
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is  in the nature of Love  itself. In  a Socratic-like dialogue, Rolle 
begins with three questions: what is love?, where is love?, and how 
do  I  love?  As  mentioned  previously,  one  can  think  of  Rolle’ 
analysis  as  a  diagram—on  one  axis  is  the  being  of  the 
contemplative, on the other, is the love that God reveals. In the 
final how of the dialogue the two axes meet.  
The three degrees of love are “insuperabile,” “inseparabile,” 
and  “synguler.”  The  contemplative  achieves  “insuperabile”  love 
when the love  is stable in  the face  of all obstacles. In marriage 
ceremony-like language, Rolle describes the love as stable whether 
“in ese or in anguys, in heel or in sekeness, so þat þe þynke þat 
þou will nat for al þe world, to haue hit withouten end, wreth God 
oo  time”  (529-531).  This  love  conforms  with  Rolle’s  wish  for 
stability of heart. This is the foundational love that the other forms 
of love rest upon. Rolle writes further that this is a good love to 
have, but it is even better for the contemplative if they can move 
into other types of love. 
If  “insuperabile”  love  is  marked  by  the  external, 
“inseparabile” love is marked by the internal. Insuperabile love is 
threatened  by  the  external,  so  that  for  Rolle  love  is  truly 
inseparabile  if  it  is  stable  and  will  not  bow  to  anything  that 
happens to the contemplative. Inseparabile is characterized by a 
oneness with Jesus. The contemplative is fastened to the thought of 
Jesus so that “þi thought and þi myght is so hooly, so entierly and 
so  perfitly  fasted,  set,  and  stablet  in  Ihesu  Criste  þat  þi  þoght 
cometh neuer of hym, neuer departeth fro hym” (538-540). The 
prepositions “of” and “fro” indicate the contemplative’s flow—they 
are  immersed  in  Jesus—being  both  a  part  of  and  emanating  out 
from.  The  only  time  the  contemplative’s  thoughts  depart  from 
Jesus  is  in  sleeping,  but  immediately  upon  waking  the 
contemplative returns to Jesus-thought. There is a singularity in this 
thinking as the contemplative is aligned with Jesus, however, Rolle 
leaves his longest discussion for the third kind of love: synguler. 
Synguler  love  is  the  highest  form  of  love  that  the 
contemplative can experience and it is marked by the feeling of 
fire that the contemplative experiences. As Rolles writes, this love 
“hath no pere” (550). The contemplative experiences solace and 
comfort from Jesus only and nothing else. For Rolle, Jesus is the 
sole occupier of the heart at this level. The fire that burns in the 
heart is “so delitable and wonderful þat I can not tel hit” (556). The 
fire defies descriptions though it is can be likened to the fire one ROMAN – UNCOUPLING THE HERMIT 
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feels if one sticks their finger in the candle’s flame (555). At this 
level  the  soul  is  Jesus-bound:  “þe  sowl  is  Ihesu  louynge,  Ihesu 
thynkynge, Ihesu desyrynge, only in coueitys of hym” (556-557). 
The gap between Jesus and the heart is lessened here—if there is a 
gap  at  all.  The  heart  begins  to  embody  the  present  progressive 
verb-form that is Jesus; the heart makes itself Jesus-ing, as it burns, 
thinks,  desires.  The  soul  makes  a  final  transformation  when  it 
becomes song.  
The soul—in the midst of its desire for Jesus, thinking of Jesus—
becomes a song of Jesus. It is at this point that Rolle points out the 
contemplative  will  be  overwhelmed  to  see  Jesus  and  that  the 
feeling of “deth swetter þan hony” (562) is proof the soul is secured 
to Him. As the contemplative is absorbed into Jesus-thought, Rolle 
still feels in his contemplative ascension that the payoff is to see 
Jesus, to have him confirmed visually. But, despite this death-wish, 
Rolle  indicates  that  along  with  the  song,  it  is  here  that  the 
contemplative  no  longer  “languishes”  rather,  it  is  here  that  the 
contemplative  experiences  the  profound  change  of  their  body 
sleeping and the heart awake. 
As Rolle points out, in the first two levels the contemplative 
languishes, like a sickness (567). It is only in the third degree that 
the  heart/soul  is  awakened  like  a  “brennynge  fyre,  and  as  þe 
nyghtgalle, þat loueth songe and melody” (571-572). This soul is 
only comforted in song and so will sing for the rest of its days of 
Jesus. Like song, the soul moves, but it is not graspable.
16 It is a 
flow both as a point (think musical notes) and as a movement (the 
notes roll along the notation, touch the ear). Rolle further wants to 
separate this song from regular every day singing. This genre of 
song is only experienced at this level of love. And, further, this love 
is a gift from God, it comes from heaven; when the contemplative 
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has this song all the songs of earth seem “bot sorowe and woo” 
(583-584). 
These  three  levels  of  love  act  as  a  guide  to  what  the 
contemplative  is  capable  of  experiencing.  The  ontology  of  love 
desires Jesus, and the need to not be separated from Him; there is 
a level or eroticism that Rolle will explore further in the lyrics and 
in  his  centering  of  worship  on  the  name  of  Jesus.  Here  Rolle’s 
ontology  is  of  a  love  that  is  there  for  the  contemplative  to 
experience  as  long  as  they  can  become  aware  of  the  fixed  and 
flowing worlds. The world of some kinds of matter are a distraction 
that  limits  what  the  contemplative  can  experience—either  by 
keeping them still or keeping them at the lower levels of the love 
experience. 
For Rolle, this ontology of love has another dimension, that of 
the Loved. The questions that Rolle poses at the end of The Form of 
Living create an ontology of God that suggests being, location, and 
intersubjectivity  between  contemplative  and  God.  God  contains 
Love and is contained by it: “love is a brennynge desire in God, 
with  a  wonderful  delite  and  sikernesse.  God  is  light  and 
brennynge”  (633-635).  This  love  emanates  through  God  (of  and 
from) so that love shows itself as object: “love is a thynge þrogh 
which God loveth vs, and loveth God, and euery of vs other” (639-
640). For Rolle, love is an object by which God and contemplative 
touch. We can think of it as the object that Rolle is attempting to 
unravel;  one  that  changes  shape,  size,  dimension  depending  on 
who is touching it. It is the object that is the nexus. Like the power 
of gravity it couples “togiddre þe louynge to þe loued” (636-637). 
Rolle  separates  Love  from  loving  here—love  is  the  object, 
something necessary in order to Love. Love is a surface of God 
and  it  is  that  surface  that  we  touch  and  love  God  and  through 
which God loves us. 
Love  is,  then,  the  turning  from  earthly  things.  This  object 
joins the contemplative with God. As Rolle writes, Love “clenseth 
þe  soule,  and  delyuereth  hit  fro  þe  peyn  of  hel”  (667).  So,  the 
nature of Love, the essence, is of a cleansing pseudobezoar, one 
that  joins,  saves,  and  centers  loving.  This  Love  is  this  centering 
object where love can be experienced; without it there is no focus, 
no clear direction for the contemplative to move. The heart, Rolle 
remarks as he closes the discussion of this first question, is central, 
as well; the contemplative’s “hert shal so bren in love þat hit shal 
be turned in to fire of love, and be as hit were al fyre, and he shal ROMAN – UNCOUPLING THE HERMIT 
131 
be so shynynge in vertuȝ þat in no partie of hym [he] be durke in 
vices”  (674-677).  The  contemplative’s  heart  becomes  fire.  It  is 
important  to  note,  however,  that  the  contemplative’s  being 
becomes the phenomenon of Love—God is fire; He is the burning—
the  true  contemplative  becomes  like  that  God-object  with  light 
emanating from them, as well. 
Love  is  found,  then,  within  a  heart  unconcerned  with 
anatomical  function.  Rolle  locates  love  not  in  works—not  in  the 
“hand  ne  in  his  mouth”  (679).  Works  lead  to  flattery  and  the 
contemplative can be misled by works down a different path, so 
that they rest in their works assured by others that they are doing 
good. Again, Rolle warns his audience about those who “seemeth 
holy” (682). The deception covers over the lack of stability in those 
who  devote  themselves  to  garnering  praise  from  others.  Rolle 
insists that good works are truly good if they are based in thinking 
about and through God. Rolle further points out that no one can 
tell if he loves God: “then can non tel me if I love God, for noght 
þat þay may see me do” (698-699). There is a division between 
those  who  do  good  and  those  who  do  good  based  in  love. 
However, as Rolle indicates, human beings are unable to tell the 
difference. Love, however, will continually work since it occupies 
the will “verraili, nat in werke bot as signe of loue” (700). Love is 
not found in  the outward  good works that are  visible except as 
sign: “loue will nat be ydel” (702). Love here is located, then, in the 
heart and it is noteworthy that it emanates out only in significance. 
Love  is  found  through  good  works,  but  it  is  not  in  the  works 
themselves.  One  who  is  “possessed”  by  love  will  act  out  in 
goodness  always,  but  the  one  who  does  good  work  is  not 
necessarily occupied by love, especially if they act in order to get 
praise. For them, though Rolle does not say so explicitly, acts and 
love are separate objects, only colliding in the true contemplative’s 
environment. On the one hand, love is foundation for good works, 
on the other hand, good works can happen without love, though, 
the implication is that these works are not “best” practices. If love 
is the object, the mediator in relations that is found in the heart, the 
gift of good works passes through it, charging it with higher value. 
Without love, as found in the one who seeks praise, the good work 
is cheapened by the giver, though the receiver still benefits from 
the gift (i.e. giving someone a blanket to keep them warm, even if 
one is doing it to receive praise, cheapens the giver’s act for the 
giver, but not the receiver’s warmth).  GLOSSATOR 7 
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In  answering  the  question,  how  does  one  love  God?,  then, 
Rolle further explores the nature of the will. The will must first be 
made meek: “he is stalworth that is meke, for al gostly streynth 
cometh  of  mekenesse”  (708-709).  The  strength  from  humility 
argument that Rolle employs delivers the contemplative into the 
might  of  will  that  the  contemplative  will  have  as  a  heavenly 
reward: “þat þay may haue hit plenerly in þe toþer” (729-730). A 
meek  will  overcomes  even  the  devil;  Rolle  sees  humility,  not 
passivity,  as  stronger.  No  matter  what  a  person  does  on  earth—
fasting or suffering—without the meekness of will that is stable, for it 
is  “nat  stirred  for  any  word  þat  men  may  say”  (722),  they  are 
unable to have love. It is interesting to note on these last items that 
Rolle is critiquing traditional ascetic acts—fasting, suffering—as not 
enough. This repeats his critiques of good works earlier in that acts 
need Love behind them. In this way, any act, for it to be worthy, 
must have love—and as an add-in here—meekness of will. 
The  heart  must  also  wisely  love  God.  Wisdom  consists  of 
moving  oneself  away  from  the  world.  Those  who  are  foolish 
“spend  in  coueitise  and  bisynesse  about  þe  world”  (738-739). 
Wisdom for Rolle most has to with object choice.  A person who is 
unable to identity true value is unable to love wisely. So, for Rolle, 
those who love an apple, rather than precious stones (in order to 
buy a castle), we would see as a fool (739-741). Rolle, oddly uses 
this extended metaphor to warn the contemplative not to be  so 
concerned  with  the  world.  The  contemplative’s  precious  jewels, 
however  are  “pouerte  and  penaunce  and  gostly  trauaille”  (742-
743). With these jewels the contemplative can buy the kingdom of 
heaven. For Rolle wisdom—using the heart wisely—has to do more 
with turning to heart to God than solving real world problems. The 
wise heart knows where true value is: in recognizing the way the 
world distracts from loving God, and, thus, correcting from that 
distraction. 
Finally,  Rolle  writes  that  the  soul  will  love  sweetly  and 
devotedly. Sweetness is connected to the chaste body and clean 
thoughts. Rolle likes this love to rest and peace: “as þou ware in 
silence and sleepe, and set in Noe shippe, þat no þynge may letþe 
of  deuocion  and  brennynge  of  swet  loue”  (769-770).  The  ship-
rested  love  will  accompany  the  contemplative  until  death—Jesus 
“resteth  in  þe”  (772).  The  sweetness  of  love,  then,  brings  the 
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Rolle  then  moves  on  to  thinking  through  how  one  would 
know one was in love. Rolle has focused thus far on the getting-to-
love and the experience of love, he further wants to explain how 
one could self-identify that what one feels is truly love. Here is a 
great level of uncertainty here for Rolle in that there is no objective 
way to verify love. Rolle  writes that if one found oneself at the 
“synguler”  level  of  experiencing  love  that  one  could  be  assured 
that  what  the  contemplative  was  feeling  was  indeed  love.  In 
“synguler” love, “he þat is so hegh, he wold nat hold hym selfe 
worþier þan þe synfullest man that gooth on þe erthe (788-790). 
So, finding oneself in love is like recognizing that one is no better 
than the lowliest sinner.  
Finally,  Rolle  addresses  the  issue  of  the  state  of  the 
contemplative: how must they be in order to love God? For Rolle, 
this has everything to do with the body: “in moste reste of body 
and soule and leste is occupied with any nedes or bisynesse of þis 
world” (820-821). Further, Rolle writes that “I have loued for to sit, 
for no penaunce ne for no fantasie ‘þat’ I would men spake of me, 
ne for no such þyng, bot only for I knewe þat I loued God more, 
and  langer  lested  with  me  comfort  of  loue,  than  goynge  or 
standynge or knelynge”  (829-831). In sitting, Rolle is rested, able 
to focus, able to aim his “hert most vpward” (833). Sitting, too, is a 
kind of flow: forming the body’s shape, setting the spine, the legs, 
the arms. So, Rolle ends The Form of Living with a discussion of 
opening the body—the experience of the body in contemplation is 
key to focus and stability. 
Rolle is first concerned with the hermit’s concern, or, to put it 
another way, the hermit’s being. The nature of the hermitic being is 
one  that  must  be  “unplugged”  from  one  assemblage  to  be  re-
coupled  to  another.  As  Kevin  Hart  writes  “the  Christian 
experience of God is that he has left his trace in the life and death 
of Jesus, that consequently it both is and is not an experience. One 
could  say,  loosely,  that  Christianity  involves  an  experience  of 
absolute  interruption.”
17 Rolle’s concern  in this work is showing 
how, ontologically speaking, the world is necessary for the hermit-
being  and  that  hermit-being  is  entwined  with  an  absolute 
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interruption that can be opened to  comprehension (albeit not full 
comprehension, since the God-object withdraws) through Love. 
As Žižek comments, “in true love, ‘I hate the beloved out of 
love’;  I  ‘hate’  the  dimension  of  his  inscription  into  the  socio-
symbolic structure on behalf of my very love for him as a unique 
person.”
18 This inscription for Žižek places limits on love, reduces 
love, and, thus, deceives us into loving the wrong kinds of things. 
Rolle wants to open the hermit to love, to avoid this deception. It is 
in  his  hermitic  ontology  that  this  “socio-symbolic”  realm  is 
punctured and Žižek’s “absolute” (absolute interruption?) can be 
seen. Žižek writes that the Absolute is “something that appears to 
us  in  fleeting  experiences—say,  through  the  gentle  smile  of  a 
beautiful  woman,  or  even  through  the  warm,  caring  smile  of  a 
person who may otherwise seem ugly and rude: in such miraculous 
but  extremely  fragile  moments,  another  dimension  transpires 
through  our  reality.”
19  Rolle’s  hermitic  ontology  frames  the 
experience  of  the  hermit  so  that  these  fragile  moments  can  be 
recognized.  
It is in Žižek’s late discussion of “uncoupling” from The Fragile 
Absolute that we see Rolle’s challenge: “as every Christian knows, 
love is the work of love—the hard and arduous work of repeated 
‘uncouplings’  in  which,  again  and  again,  we  have  to  disengage 
ourselves from the inertia  that constrains us to identify with the 
particular  order  we  were  born  into.”
20  With  Rolle  (and  Žižek), 
then, we can ask, how do we continually uncouple and not fall into 
a  rigidity that  leaves  the hermit unsatisfied and destroyed while 
avoiding the rigidity of fundamentalism in which the smile from 
the ugly goes unrecognized or the fixed becomes a resting place? 
We must keep hermit-ing. 
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